Medicare's Prospective Payment System at Age
Eight: Mature Success or Midlife Crisis?
Bruce C. Vladeck*
The enactment of Medicare's Prospective Payment System
(PPS) for hospitals in 19831 was accompanied by extraordinary
hoopla and rhetoric, if not by prolonged Congressional deliberation or even by committee hearings. PPS constituted an
extraordinary change in the method by which the government
paid some $40 billion annually to the nation's hospitals for the
provision of inpatient care to 28 million Medicare beneficiaries.
Such a huge change of direction might have been expected to
be the focus of considerable attention, at least among those
with a professional interest in hospital matters, but PPS was
depicted in even grander terms. Proposed near the highwater
mark of the Reagan Revolution in domestic policy, PPS was
depicted as a critical step in the "deregulation" of American
hospitals, as a major initiative in establishing "marketplace
competition" in the health care industry, and as a sophisticated
application of the principle of using incentives rather than
"command and control" regulation to make public policy more
consonant with microeconomic theory.2
In keeping with this "marketplace" model, Reagan's
Department of Health and Human Services and Office of Management and Budget conceived of PPS as a largely self-maintaining system that would pay hospitals a uniform national
rate, adjusted only for differences in local wage rates and the
effects of teaching programs, for each of 467 Diagnosis-Related
Groups (DRGs). There would be no appeals process and no
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exceptions process. Some of PPS's more extreme ideological
enthusiasts suggested that once the system was fully implemented there would not even be a need to collect cost data
from hospitals. Each year, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services would update payment rates for inflation, while continuing to refine the classification 3 process that assigned cases
to DRGs. And that would be that.
Under such a system, it was argued, hospitals would have
an extremely powerful incentive to control their costs, since

those able to deliver care for less than the uniform rate would
be able to keep all the savings, while those whose costs
exceeded the rates would be at risk of financial catastrophe.
Of course, in such a market, a considerable number of hospitals might be expected to fail-perhaps as many as a third,
according to one Administration official. 4 That was just the
expected price to be paid for the replacement of the inherent
evils of cost-based reimbursement with a more economically
rational system such as PPS.
PPS is now approaching its eighth birthday. It is widely
viewed as a success, credited for both a transformation of the
hospital industry and the saving of many billions of dollars.
These credited savings have, not inconsequentially, postponed
the date at which the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund is projected to be insolvent.5 Early fears that such a system of cost
controls would lead to serious impairments in the quality of
care provided to Medicare beneficiaries appear to have been
disproved, as have anxieties that widespread hospital closings
and resource scarcity would impair access to needed services
for beneficiaries.
Despite these apparent successes, there may be less to PPS
than meets the eye. PPS may have constrained Medicare
expenditures, but over the last five years real hospital costs
have been rising at rates close to the pre-PPS pattern. Even
the savings from the early years of PPS may have been at least
partially the result of forces largely external to PPS. At the
same time, contrary to all expectations, America's hospitals
have experienced unprecedented prosperity during the first
eight years of PPS. Somewhat more hospitals may have closed
3. Id. at iii-vi.
4. Cosure Increase Predicted-Is Your Hospital At Risk?, HOSPITALS, June 1,
1984, at 38.
5. L. RUSSELL, MEDICARE'S NEW HOSPITAL PAYMENT SYSTEM: IS IT WORKING? 70-

75 (1989).
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during that time than might otherwise have been expected, but
the numbers are still not terribly large. And the verdict may
still be out on some of the quality issues.
As discussion of more systemic reform of the nation's
health care system gains more attention, this may be a good
time to take stock of what PPS has and has not accomplished
and what lessons it may hold for future policy, both for hospital payment and for government financing of health care. It is
also likely that over the next several years, as the pressures
surrounding PPS intensify for reasons that will be discussed
below, the basic rationale and structure of the system will be
increasingly debated, whether or not more general reform also
takes place.
What follows is necessarily a rather selective (for reasons
of brevity and reader tolerance) and even subjective attempt to
summarize the experience under PPS to date and to suggest
some lessons that might be drawn from that experience for the
future reform of PPS itself and of payment systems generally.
No attempt will be made here to be comprehensive, to explain
all the technical details of an inherently and increasingly complex system, nor even to systematically survey the rapidly
growing body of literature. But the few issues and themes that
clearly stand out will be the focus of most of this paper. The
paper begins with a review of the aggregate data on PPS's performance since its inception, looking at the effects both on the
payor, Medicare, and the payees, the nation's hospitals. It will
then consider some of the distributional patterns of benefits
and losses potentially concealed by those aggregate figures.
The issues of quality and access and the related impacts of the
system on health care generally will then be quickly considered. This will be followed by a more evaluative consideration
of the major strengths and weaknesses of PPS and a consideration of future directions for the program.
I.

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED

In order to understand both the context in which PPS was
enacted and the way in which it has evolved, two basic issues
must be understood. First, PPS was born from the intellectual
discrediting of cost-based reimbursement for hospital and
other health care services. The enactment of PPS in 1983
culminated a five-year political process that effectively began
when the hospital industry, seeking to defeat. President
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Carter's cost containment legislation in 1978 and 1979, undertook a "Voluntary Effort" to control the rate of hospital cost
growth. This Carter Administration proposal followed relatively traditional price-control principles which, it must be
noted, had worked in the past, both in the Nixon Economic
Stabilization Program and in a number of states. But after a
brief hiatus at the outset of the "Voluntary Effort," hospital
costs proceeded to grow at even higher rates, partly-but only
partly-because of record levels of inflation in the economy as
a whole. By 1982 and 1983, therefore, an extremely embarrassed hospital industry recognized that some form of limit on
payments was inevitable and tried to cut the best deal it could
with an angry Congress. 6 By early 1983, DRG-based hospital
payments had been successfully in place in New Jersey for
three years. 7 However, there was neither a broad base of experience nor a well-developed conceptual underpinning for any
system of hospital payment in the United States other than the
cost reimbursement or rate-setting models which were energetically rejected in the deregulatory climate of the time.
Thus, what PPS had going for it, politically and rhetorically,
was that it was clearly not cost-based reimbursement and
ostensibly not rate-setting either. Just about everything else
had to be made up as policymakers went along.
Second, PPS was established within the framework of the
budgetary strictures of the early Reagan Administration and
within the rules of the then-new Budget Reform process and
the subsequent procedures of Gramm-Rudman. To my mind,
the greatest innovation in the Administration proposal that
became PPS was the assignment to the Secretary of HHS of
real budgetary control over Part A of the Medicare program.
Once the system was up and running, the Secretary would provide an annual update factor for the DRG rates, and that
(more or less) would be that.' If improvements in medical
recordkeeping or development of new technologies required
6. K. DAVIS, G. ANDERSON, D. ROWLAND, & E. STEINBERG, HEALTH CARE COST
CONTAINMENT 29-31 (1990).
7. In the interests of full disclosure, the author must note his personal
involvement in the New Jersey DRG system from 1979 through early 1982 when, as
Assistant Commissioner of Health, he had operational responsibility for development
and implementation of that system. As a result of that experience, he was consulted
by the designers of PPS, although those in the executive branch explicitly rejected
those aspects of the New Jersey system they thought too "regulatory."
8. Vladeck, Comment on "HospitalReimbursement Under Medicare," 62 MILBANK

FUND Q.: HEALTH AND SOcIETY 269, 272 (1984).
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changes in the DRGs themselves, those too would be implemented on a budget-neutral basis.
The flip side of this budgetary coin, however, was that
budget estimates and targets were to be derived from "current
services" estimates, which were projections of expenditures
under existing Medicare law in the absence of policy change.
But the Medicare system being replaced was cost-based and in
the midst of the greatest year-to-year increases in its history,
due partly to inflation in the economy as a whole. In order to
get PPS started by establishing rates for federal fiscal year
(FY) 1984, the rules said that one began with a projection
based on FY 1981 and 1982 data, the most recent data then
available, of what Medicare would otherwise be paying hospitals under cost-based reimbursement. Thus, the initial PPS
rates were based on the very high inflationary expectations of
a period of unprecedented cost growth.
The estimates of what Medicare would otherwise have
been paying in FY 1984, which became the base for the first
year's PPS rates, were further inflated by some technical
errors on the part of the relatively junior staff making this
"current services" estimate, combined perhaps with some cynical averting of the eyes by political appointees eager for peace
with the hospital community. The result was first-year PPS
rates far in excess of what hospitals might have expected
under cost-based reimbursement.
To restate this important, but not widely-understood process, the standard of "budget neutrality" established for the
first year of PPS meant that the initial PPS rates were supposed to be based on 1981-82 costs trended forward by historical
inflation estimates drawn from a particularly inflationary
period. These initial rates were then made higher still by some
technical estimation problems. By definition, these generous
rates did not represent additional outlays for the federal government, just the outlays it had projected. It did mean, however, extraordinarily lucrative results for the hospitals and the
development of a set of myths and perceptions that have
affected the evolution of PPS ever since.
The excessive generosity of first-year PPS rates would
have been more immediately apparent and would have engendered more immediate pressures for serious policy change had
it not been for the simultaneous and entirely unanticipated
fall-off in hospital utilization by Medicare beneficiaries. In the
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period surrounding the implementation of PPS, it was widely
expected that Medicare admissions would increase, since the
system had such a powerful incentive to hospitals in that direction. PPS is a highly volume-sensitive system. It pays a fixed
price for each hospitalization of a given type-the 200th
uncomplicated heart attack treated by a particular hospital in a
particular year is paid at exactly the same rate as the first. For
most hospitalizations, however, marginal costs are highly different from average costs, both because many costs are relatively fixed, at least in the short run, and because hospitals and
physicians become more proficient, and thus more efficient,
when they treat large numbers of the same kinds of cases.
In the debate, such as it was, surrounding the enactment
of PPS, there was extensive controversy around this payment
of a fixed price, regardless of volume. Many experts feared
both a too-powerful incentive to increase admissions and an
excessive financial risk for hospitals with admissions downturns.9 At least in part, Congress responded by transforming

the much-unloved Professional Standards Review Organization
(PSRO) program into the new Peer Review Organization
(PRO) program with a primary responsibility to deter and punish unnecessary admissions and by mandating an additional
series of studies of the issue.'
The Reagan Administration,
however, infatuated with notions of the "marketplace," liked
the idea of rewarding those who successfully "competed" for
increased volume and punishing those who failed."
In any event, for reasons that are still subject to debate,
Medicare admissions, which had steadily increased since the
start of the program in 1966, fell dramatically in the period
surrounding the implementation of PPS (See Table 1).

9. Id. at 270-71.
10. Lave, HospitalReimbursement Under Medicare, 62 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND
Q.: HEALTH AND SOCIETY 251, 262-63 (1984).
11. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, HOSPITAL PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
FOR MEDICARE: REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 2, at 108-09.
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TABLE 1: ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN HOSPITAL
ADMISSIONS

12

Admissions by Age
All Admissions

Under 65

65 and Over

1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

0.4%
2.7
2.9
0.9
0.0
-0.5
-3.7
-4.9
-2.1
-0.6
-0.4
-1.0

-1.0%
1.7
1.5
0.0
-1.6
-2.8
-4.2
-4.7
-2.5
-1.0
-1.6
-2.0

4.9%
5.3
6.7
3.0
4.1
4.7
-2.6
-5.2
-1.0
0.4
2.0
1.2

Average:
1978-83
1984-89

1.0
-2.1

-0.4
-2.7

4.8
-0.9

Year

There were three primary reasons for the decline in
admissions. First, there was simple panic and hysteria in many
quarters of the hospital community in what might be called the
peri-PPS period. Many hospital managers did a lot of irrational and thoughtless things, including clamping down on
admissions for fear of economic loss when a more dispassionate
analysis would have shown those admissions to be profitable
on the margin. Second, as Table 1 demonstrates, a range of
factors largely exogenous to PPS, most of them having to do
with the proliferation of new outpatient services and changes
in insurance coverage, were reducing hospital admissions for
the non-Medicare population. Some of this reduction undoubtedly spilled over to Medicare patients. Third and perhaps most
importantly, most of the new PROs established by simple
administrative fiat that Medicare would no longer pay for cataract operations on an inpatient basis, except under extraordinary circumstances. Seven other routine elective surgical
procedures were treated in the same manner. Since cataract
12. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE
PAYMENT AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 66
(June 1, 1990) [hereinafter PROPAC REPORT, June 1990].
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surgery represented the single most common reason for Medicare admissions prior to PPS, tens of thousands of inpatient
3
cases disappeared almost overnight.'
Whatever the reasons, the decline in admissions coincidental with the implementation of PPS produced real savings to
the Medicare program. These savings cannot logically be attributed to PPS "incentives," because the actual economic incentives of PPS run in directly the opposite direction.
Nonetheless, the reduction in Medicare outlays resulting from
the reduction in utilization permitted government officials to
quickly proclaim PPS a success and permitted the hospital
industry to assert that it had responded well and demonstrated
the virtues of PPS by becoming so much more "productive."
PPS also contains incentives for hospitals to reduce length
of stay, as was indeed intended. Payment for any given case
(except for a small number of exceptional "outliers") is fixed
in advance, regardless of how long the patient remains in the
hospital. Here, too, the immediate post-PPS results were dramatic. Medicare lengths of stay, which had been falling slowly
before PPS, fell a full fifteen percent between 1982 and 1986.
Since that time admission rates for elective surgery and other
relatively simple cases have continued to decline, accelerating
the longstanding secular trend. In addition, the Medicare
caseload has gotten sicker, and length of stay has begun to
4
creep back up.'

Thus, the inception of PPS brought with it an enormous
reduction in Medicare utilization, with concomitant savings for
Medicare. This was combined with an enormous growth in
per-case Medicare revenues for hospitals, with concomitantly
high hospital profits. Everyone, it appeared, was a winner. The
possible exception was that group of Medicare beneficiaries
discharged earlier from hospitals, putatively "quicker and
sicker."
Since approximately the first eighteen months of PPS, the
trends in both hospital costs and hospital profits have changed
direction. Figure 1 shows patterns of increase in per-case payments and costs over the first seven years of PPS, along with
changes in the market basket (the index of increases in input
prices experienced by hospitals) and the actual update or inflation factors applied to PPS rates. The most important parts of
13. L. RUSSELL, supra note 5, at 27-29.
14. PRoPAC REPORT, June 1990, supra note 12, at 66.
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Figure 1 are the spike in payments (solid line) in the first two
years and the growth in costs after the first year, at a rate
roughly equal in real terms to the rate of hospital cost
increases in the pre-PPS period.
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Figure 1 contains the kind of data that makes for particularly lively and confusing public policy debate, since there is
something in it for almost everyone. Critics of hospitals and of
the theory of economic incentives point to the rate of cost
increases since PPS 1 and argue that not even the powerful
incentives of PPS have induced hospitals to change their costincurring behavior. Hospitals can point to the aggregate
increase in costs since PPS was implemented and argue with
some justice that it is lower than might otherwise have been
the case. Hospitals also argue, quite correctly, that Medicare's
costs are growing much more slowly than before the inception
of PPS, while pointing, with increasing fervor, to the growing
cumulative disjunction between growth in the market basket
and PPS updates.
In order to complete a general summary picture of the
effects of PPS to date, three additional pieces of information
are necessary: hospital margins, case-mix change, and total
Medicare outlays. Figure 2 shows the "bottom line" for hospitals both under the PPS system and in general over the life of
PPS. In the terminology that has grown up around these
issues, "margins" is used instead of profitability because of the
large proportion of hospitals that are either private, non-profit
corporations or governmentally-owned. "PPS margin" is a
term of art comparing hospital operating expenses attributable
(through defined cost allocation practices) to Medicare
patients, except for capital and direct medical education costs
passed through on a cost-reimbursement basis under PPS, to
PPS revenues. "Total margin" is a more straightforward measure of profitability, comparing total revenues to total
expenses.
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Two points about Figure 2 are worthy of special note.
First, under pre-PPS cost-based reimbursement, Medicare
margins were zero by law and by definition. Thus, in some
sense, the early years of PPS constituted an extraordinary
windfall for the nation's hospitals. The reaction of policymakers to the perception of that windfall, once the numbers
became known, is also readily apparent. Not shown on the
graph is the estimate that by PPS 7 (FY 1990) PPS margins
averaged less than zero. This means that the average hospital
lost money on care of Medicare patients in that year.17 Second,
although historical data on total margins are incomplete, the
total hospital margins reported in the early years of PPS were,
as one might expect, significantly larger than the historical
norm. The persistence of total margins at these historically
high levels, even after PPS became substantially less lucrative,
raises interesting questions about the effectiveness of nonMedicare payors in limiting their expenses. This fuels the
charges of "cost-shifting" now increasingly heard from private
insurers and employers.
The evolution of PPS has been characterized by a series of
delayed reactions because the availability of reliable data
always lags behind reality and because political perception generally lags behind the data. This phenomenon is illustrated by
the history of PPS margins. It was not until late 1985 or early
1986 that Congress became fully aware of how well hospitals
had done in the initial PPS period. Update factors were then
slashed dramatically. By 1989, on the other hand, falling PPS
margins in 1986 and 1987, and hospital industry projections of
even lower PPS margins in future years, had largely convinced
the Congress of the undesirability of any more drastic
reductions.
Actually, looking only at the comparison between update
factors and the market basket, as the hospital community is
fond of doing, significantly understates the rate of growth of
PPS payments. After all, PPS pays a pre-defined rate per case,
depending on the actual clinical characteristics of the case, for
each of what are now almost 490 DRGs. Hospital case-mix
changes over time, however, and for good and obvious reasons
this change is almost always in the direction of greater intenAND
REPORT
COMMISSION,
ASSESSMENT
PAYMENT
17. PROSPECTIVE
RECOMENDATIONS TO THE CONGRESS 16 (March 1, 1991) [hereinafter PROPAC REPORT,

March 1991].
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sity. Since the inception of PPS, average Medicare case mix
has increased by more than twenty percent and has accounted
for more growth in payments to hospitals than the update factor.'" This explains the divergence between the lines representing the market basket and payments per discharge in
Figure 1. A rough guess (all that is available) would be that
half of the cumulative change in case-mix intensity is attributable to changes in patient characteristics and patterns of treatment. The other half is attributable to improved medical
records reporting by hospitals-the famous "DRG creep."' 9
The conventional wisdom among PPS aficionados is that
increased payments for "real" changes in case-mix index are
legitimate, since they should track quite accurately changes in
the costs that hospitals need to incur in treating sicker or more
expensive patients. Changes in payment resulting from "DRG
creep," on the other hand, are not legitimate and should be
compensated for by offsetting reductions elsewhere in the payment system-in update factors, for example.
The "bottom line" on the first six years of PPS can be
seen in Table 2. PPS has clearly slowed the rate of increase in
Medicare outlays to hospitals. However, at least some of this
deceleration in payments to hospitals has been negated by
enormous increases in expenditures for other categories of
services. At least some of this corresponding increase may
have occurred in direct response to PPS, as hospitals sought,
for instance, to expand lucrative outpatient services to replace
feared revenue losses on inpatient care.

18. PRoPAC REPORT, June 1990, supra note 12, at 27.
19. Id. at 27-28.
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As the system matures, it appears to have the capacity to
continue to enforce relatively stringent limits on payments to
hospitals. Whether or not it continues to do so, however,
depends not only on the aggregate levels of Medicare payments
or hospital margins but also on the extent to which it can meet
standards of perceived fairness in the distribution of federal
payments.
II.

DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS

In creating the Prospective Payment System, the federal
government not only undertook to limit (and presumably
rationalize) Medicare payments to hospitals, but also undertook to implement a uniform national system. To be sure, PPS
recognized from the outset differences in labor market characteristics from one part of the country to another and differences in hospitals' involvement in graduate medical education.
Furthermore, because the data showed that, even accounting
for wage differentials, rural hospitals were systematically less
costly than those in urban areas, PPS began as a dual system
with separate standardized amounts for urban and rural hospitals.21

Still, one rate per labor-market area was a radical

change from a specific rate for each hospital. Indeed, PPS was
conceived of and to a surprising degree even enacted as a single
system of rates for the nation as a whole.
That single-rate concept of PPS was perfectly consonant
with the ideological climate that prevailed when PPS was created, but it fit much less well with the underlying realities of
hospital cost variation. For reasons that are not very well
understood (it is, in fact, extraordinary how many aspects of
hospital economics are not very well understood) hospital costs
vary remarkably from one institution to the next, even after
one controls for differences in case-mix, input prices, teaching
activity, and the like. Some of those differences are systematic.
Hospitals in certain communities simply have higher costs than
those in other communities. Some differences, however,
appear to be largely random. In the Medicare system, after
controlling for all the factors taken into account for PPS, the
average DRG has a coefficient of cost variation of greater than
1.0. This means that the variance exceeds the mean or, put
21. The standardized amount is the base rate which, when multiplied by the
weight of the specific DRG and adjusted for the wage index for the hospital's area,
produces the payment for that DRG in that hospital.
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another way, that most DRGs contain cases that are either
quite different from one another clinically or similar clinically
but treated at extremely variable costs across hospitals.
Cost variation among hospitals poses a profound intellectual and political problem for PPS. If one takes the implicit
logic of PPS seriously, then all such variation must arise either
from technical flaws in the payment system, which is not adequately accounting for "legitimate" sources of variation, from
differences in physician practice patterns, or from differences
in managerial efficiency across hospitals. Differences in practice patterns are now the subject of an enormous amount of
research. Yet, for most hospital cases there is not now (and
may never be) any strong, codified professional consensus as to
the one best way to treat a particular case. No one believes
that managerial differences could really account for as much
cost variation as apparently exists. However, no one has been
able to explain away very much more of these differences by
identifying additional factors not adequately taken into account
by PPS. Practice variations have become an all-encompassing
explanation of otherwise unexplained residual cost variation,
but the verdict is still out as to the extent to which they really
do account for cost variation at the hospital level or the extent
to which they can or should be reduced by a greater homogenization of clinical practice. Further, if large preexisting cost differences among hospitals do exist, are not adequately
explained by the payment system, and are not adequately
reflective of differences in hospital management, then some
institutions are being unjustly rewarded, often in considerable
measure, while others are being unjustly punished.
The policy dilemma posed by preexisting cost variation
might be restated as follows. If costs truly result from hospitals' discretionary behavior, then cost-based reimbursement, in
effect, rewards the profligate by paying them more. On the
other hand, if costs are driven by factors outside the control of
hospital managers, then paying a uniform rate unfairly penalizes higher cost institutions while providing an unwarranted
windfall to lower-cost hospitals. The truth undoubtedly is that
some costs fall into each category. If one assumes that a payment system should embody the value that less expensive is
preferable to more, then neither a purely cost-based system
nor one based on fixed rates will be entirely equitable.
Cost variation that is neither adequately explained by the
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PPS formula nor plausibly attributable to managerial performance also calls into question the whole logic of "incentives"
under PPS. To begin with, some hospitals can be expected to
enter the system anticipating either windfalls or revenue
reductions that are not grounded in anything over which they
have much control. Incentives, in order to mean anything,
must be prospective. Since uniform rates were not introduced
into a world of uniform costs, however, considerable punishments and rewards attach to what may be largely the results of
idiosyncratic circumstances. Moreover, in order for incentives
to work prospectively, they should give clear and comprehensible signals to the individuals and institutions that are supposed
to respond to them. Uniform rates in a world of non-uniform
costs obviously do not meet that test.
Although the conceptual challenge to PPS posed by cost
variation is formidable, the political challenge is at once more
serious and more remediable. The American policymaking system may be capable, from time to time, of enacting measures
as far-reaching, theoretically elegant, and uncertain in their
effect as PPS, but the American political system is not capable
of tolerating them for very long. A legislative branch tied to
local constituencies and lacking strong, if any, party discipline
will be unwilling to leave so neat a scheme alone for long.
This is pspecially true in the face of a weak or indifferent
executive.
Indeed, even before PPS was enacted, Congress sought to
attenuate some of its more dramatic distributional effects. In
conflict with the Administration's proposal, it phased in uniform national rates over four years, "blending" them with
more homogenous regional rates. In addition, Congress separated out rural from urban standardized amounts, and doubled
the proposed (empirically-derived) adjustment for the indirect
cost effects of graduate medical education. Congress also chose
not to incorporate costs associated with capital expenditures
into the initial PPS system, since capital costs, owing to the
long-term nature of such expenses, tend to vary across hospitals even more than operating costs.
The Congress has continued to tinker with PPS, moving it
further and further from the original concept of a single uniRural hospitals, hospitals in rural counties
form system.
adjoining urban areas, hospitals in New England and the Great
Lakes states, hospitals in metropolitan areas of over one mil-
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lion in population plus Providence, and other groups of hospitals with sympathetic representatives have all benefitted from
special refinements to the system. Most importantly, teaching
hospitals and hospitals serving relatively large proportions of
low-income patients, the so-called "disproportionate share"
hospitals, have been the special beneficiaries of Congressional
generosity in recent years. As the number of the uninsured
has increased and as Medicaid and other sources of financing
health care for the poor have constrained payments to hospitals, inner-city institutions (a category that includes a large
proportion, though far from all, of the major teaching hospitals) have encountered serious financial straits. Congress has
directly sought to redress these financial difficulties through
modifications to PPS that are increasingly disconnected from
the data on the costs that those institutions incur in treating
Medicare beneficiaries.
In spite of, or perhaps because of, these Congressional
efforts to redress real or perceived inequities in PPS, hospital
margins have become more, not less, dispersed since the inception of PPS. Table 3 captures the dispersion in outcomes both
within and across identifiable groups of hospitals in the fifth
year of PPS (FY 1988), and all evidence suggests that such dispersion continues to increase. 2

22. PRoPAC REPORT, March 1991, supra note 17, at 17.

472
TABLE

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 14:453

3: DISTRIBUTION OF PPS OPERATING MARGINS IN THE
FIFTH YEAR OF PPS, BY HOSPITAL GROUP
23
(IN PERCENT)
Percentile

Hospital Group
All hospitals
Urban
Rural
Large urban
Other urban
Rural referral
Sole community
Other rural
Major teaching
Other teaching
Non-teaching
Disproportionate
share:
Large urban
Other urban
Rural
Non-disproportionate
share
Urban < 100 beds
Urban 100-249 beds
Urban 250-404 beds
Urban 405-684 beds
Urban 685+ beds
Rural < 50 beds
Rural 50-99 beds
Rural 100-169 beds
Rural 170+ beds
Voluntary
Proprietary
Urban government
Rural government

10th

25th

-28.3%
-22.2
-33.9
-25.5
-19.1
-14.8
-45.0
-35.2
-5.8
-17.5
-30.5

-

-21.7
-15.5
-29.4

-7.3
-5.3
-11.6

-30.2
-36.3
-23.8
-16.9
-11.9
-8.2
-48.5
-28.2
-28.2
-16.8
-23.5
-32.9
-22.0
-44.7

-14.1
-14.7
-11.7
-6.8
-5.1
1.7
-20.8
-13.4
-13.3
-9.2
-10.2
-16.9
-7.2
-18.0

Median

75th

90th

-0.5%
1.2
-2.6
-0.3
2.4
1.1
-6.3
-2.6
14.5
2.3
-1.8

9.8%
10.7
8.5
10.1
1.4
8.0
7.0
8.7
22.5
10.1
8.8

18.6%
19.7
17.2
19.8
19.3
15.5
14.5
18.0
33.0
18.8
17.7

4.2
4.0
1.3

14.9
14.1
12.8

23.0
22.5
19.3

-2.0
1.7
-0.6
1.4
4.4
9.8
-2.4
-3.2
-1.8
-1.7
0.4
-2.8
3.7
-3.5

8.0
13.4
9.5
9.7
13.1
22.1
11.4
6.6
6.5
5.3
9.8
9.4
14.9
8.4

16.6
24.0
17.4
17.5
20.0
38.8
20.4
14.0
13.3
14.8
18.2
17.9
24.3
18.5

12.2%

-9.3
-15.5
-12.3
-7.5
-8.1
-22.3
-16.1
3.4
-6.6
-14.2

Note: Excludes hospitals in Maryland and New Jersey.

This dispersion becomes more of a problem for PPS, both
conceptually and politically, as the system in general gets
23. PRoPAC REPORT, June 1990, supra note 12, at 35.
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tighter and as hospital costs continue to increase faster than
PPS payments. The average non-teaching, non-disproportionate share hospital is now losing money treating Medicare
patients. Only the continued willingness, however unintentional, of other payers to continue to subsidize those institutions prevents, I believe, the political pressures on PPS from
becoming unbearable.

III. QUALITY, ACCESS, AND So FORTH
In early 1985, both the popular and trade press were filled
with stories that helpless elderly patients were being discharged prematurely from hospitals as the result of a fiendish
new Medicare program that established limits on how long
patients could remain in the hospital. The Department of
Health and Human Services's Inspector General began an
investigation, and the Senate Committee on Aging held a series
of hearings on this phenomenon of "quicker and sicker."2 4 The
hearings, however, were inconclusive, and the furor died down.
In retrospect, it was perhaps inevitable that consumer
advocates and other partisans would welcome a basis for criticism of PPS. These groups were reflexively suspicious of any
policy innovation endorsed by a Reagan Administration that
had sought to make major cuts in Social Security benefits. It is
also hardly surprising that so complex and technical a system,
one that had been implemented with so little public discussion
or analysis, would have engendered considerable anxiety and
confusion. There is also no question that some egregious cases
of poor treatment attributed to PPS actually did occur. This
occurred in part because many in the hospital industry, particularly at the front-line service level, were as confused about
PPS as everybody else. Moreover, as noted above, there was a
fair amount of institutional panic in the peri-PPS period, at
least some of it fed by consultants and systems vendors eager
to sell their products.
The furor over "quicker and sicker" was short-lived
largely because much of the Washington policy community
quickly closed ranks behind PPS. The early readings of considerable savings helped cement the Administration-industryCongressional alliance that had enacted PPS so painlessly.
24. Quality of Care Under Medicare's Prospective Payment System: Hearings
Before the Special Committee on Aging of the United States Senate, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985) (Serial Nos. 99-9, 10, 11).
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More serious analyses of the qualitative impacts of PPS followed, however, and are continuing to the present time.
To summarize a wide and disparate body of literature, the
reductions in Medicare lengths of stay following the implementation of PPS did indeed result in the discharging of many
Medicare patients quicker and sicker, but that was probably
not an unambiguously bad thing.2" Indeed, the desire for
reductions in length of stay for all patients was gospel wisdom
throughout the health care community. The belief that length
of stay should be reduced reflected not only broad clinical consensus about the deleterious effects of overly long hospital
stays, especially for the elderly, but also recognition that hospitalizations were systematically much shorter on the West
Coast than elsewhere in the nation, without apparent adverse
effects on the health of patients.
One possible measure of harmful effects from too early
hospital discharges would be an increase in readmissions to the
hospital resulting from recurrence or exacerbation of the condition treated in the initial hospitalization. Readmission rates
should be an especially sensitive indicator of PPS-induced
deterioration in quality because a per-case payment system
obviously gives hospitals an incentive to provide as many separate admissions as possible to treat a given illness. For this
reason, review of readmissions was one of the major priorities
initially assigned to the PROs.2" Here, the evidence is unambiguous, even if the interpretation is not. Since the inception
of PPS, readmission rates among Medicare beneficiaries have
fallen rather dramatically for reasons that have yet to be adequately explained.'
The most important and complex aspect of the "quicker
and sicker" issue has to do with patterns of post-discharge
services. It might well be that the earlier discharge of many
Medicare patients would be appropriate if they could or should
be better served at "alternative" levels of care, such as nursing
home care or home health care. PPS began, however, at a time
when the long-term care system in most communities in the
United States was in considerable disarray. Further, cutbacks
in Medicare benefits for nursing homes and home health care
25. Wilensky, Medicare at 25: Better Value and Better Care, 264 J. A.M.A. 1996
(1990).
26. L. RUSSELL, supra note 5, at 53.
27. PROPAC REPORT, June 1990, supra note 12, at 76-78.
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were undertaken by the Reagan Administration in the mid1980s as part of a general budget-cutting strategy. Thus, discharges to long-term care that might have made both clinical
sense for many Medicare patients and good public policy
became instances of inadequate care because of the inadequacy
of Medicare's long-term care policy.'
Further, relatively careful analysis has since demonstrated
that the overall quality of care of Medicare beneficiaries, to the
extent that it is measurable, actually improved after the implementation of PPS. The number of inappropriate premature
discharges did increase, but Medicare patients received better
care overall, for whatever reasons. 9 It is hard to make a logical connection between those improved outcomes and characteristics of PPS, except perhaps for the generalized prosperity
experienced by hospitals in 1984 and 1985. In the aggregate, at
least, PPS appears not to have made things worse.
After the political excitement about "quicker and sicker,"
if not the substantive importance of the issue, died down, the
next apparent crisis in PPS was occasioned in 1985 through
1987 by the closing of a number of hospitals, the majority of
them in rural areas. The potential vulnerability of small, rural
hospitals to a per-case payment system had been a concern
since PPS was first proposed, and rural advocates were
unhappy from the outset with the establishment of a lower
standardized amount for rural hospitals. A very effective lobbying campaign by representatives of rural hospitals soon followed, buttressed by data that demonstrated that many rural
hospitals were losing substantial sums of money under PPS.
The logic of payment on a flat, per-case basis in a world of
considerable cost variation does suggest that hospitals with relatively small numbers of cases are at higher risk of large random losses. This is essentially because the statistical Law of
Large Numbers, which basically holds that concentration
around the mean increases with sample size, is so important to
making PPS work in actual practice. Nonetheless, extensive
analysis has since suggested that rural hospital closings have
more to do with changes in rural populations and economies,
28. B. Vladeck, Report to the United Hospital Fund of New York on DRGs and
Quality of Care: Facts and Fantasy (December 1985) (copy on file with the University
of Puget Sound Law Review).
29. Rogers, Draper, Kahn, Keeler, Rubenstein, Kosecoff, & Brook, Quality of Care
Before and After Implementation of the DRG-Based Prospective Payment Syster" A
Summary of Effects, 264 J. A.M.A. 1989 (1990).
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and the increasing preference of rural residents for treatment
in larger institutions with more sophisticated technology, than
with the effects of PPS. Access of rural Medicare beneficiaries
to needed hospital services does not appear to have suffered.'
That evidence has not, on the other hand, prevented the Congress from amending PPS at least four times to tilt payments
more in the direction of rural hospitals.
In other words, no one has yet demonstrated that PPS has
created crises in quality or access. This is not to say that PPS
never will create such crises. Prosperity conceals a multitude
of sins, and the behavior of hospitals under a prospective payment system in which they are earning profits may differ considerably from their behavior once they begin losing serious
money. On the other hand, the relationship between revenue,
margins, quality, and access, which is so blithely assumed in
public policy discussions of payment systems and so eagerly
emphasized by health care providers, may be more complex
than is generally assumed.
In simple-minded economic analysis, increases in expenditures for the production of health services may be simply
equated with improvements in quality. However, everything
we know about the relationship between cost and quality in
health care, and in many other sectors of the economy as well,
suggests that such a simple equation is not the case. The best
hospitals, like the best cars or best meals, are not always the
most expensive. It is well-established that, for a broad range of
procedures performed at a particular hospital, the higher the
volume the higher the quality and the lower the cost.3 Further, it must be recognized that, in such a labor-intensive
industry as health care, the great preponderance of costs are
payments to individuals. Higher costs may therefore result
from higher incomes (rents, in economic terms) to professionals whose incomes are related only indistinctly to the quality of
the services that they provide. This does not mean that the
converse necessarily holds true. Cheaper is not necessarily
better either. But the tendency of provider representatives to
hold out the specter of impaired quality whenever policy interventions threaten their incomes can cause one to feel at least a
degree of skepticism on this issue.
Similarly, if one starts, as almost everyone in the health
30. PRoPAC REPORT, June 1990, supra note 12, at 73-75.
31. Id. at 81.
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care community does, from the supposition that we have more
hospitals in this society than we really need, then the closing
of any particular hospital, for whatever reason, may not be
such a bad thing. Moreover, such evidence as we do have on
hospital closings suggests that sustained financial losses are a
necessary but far from sufficient condition for hospital closings. Declining utilization is a far more important predictor of
closure. When an institution closes because no one goes there
anymore, it is hard to fairly describe that as a reduction in
access to care.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

PPS might be considered an unqualified success if one concludes that the government is saving money, that hospitals, if
not prospering, are at least continuing to get by, and that quality and access are not being negatively affected. But of course,
things are not that simple. PPS contains, at its core, at least
four fundamental problems. All of them can be patched and
papered over indefinitely, and none of them alone, or even
altogether, may be politically troublesome enough to sink the
system. However, all of these problems need to be addressed
in one form or another, both as PPS evolves and, more importantly, as the nation tries to reform its health care system.
These four problems are that PPS applies only to Medicare, that it applies only to inpatient services, that it may contain fundamental, structural problems of fairness, and that it
may have been designed, or modified, to achieve inherently
incompatible goals. Each will be considered in turn.
A.

Medicare Only

Most obviously but perhaps most centrally, PPS applies
only to Medicare patients and no payment system is, or can be,
an island. To the extent that other payers do not play by precisely the same rules, whatever incentives the PPS system contains are weakened or destroyed. Thus, hospitals whose costs
exceed their PPS payments may not need to change their
behavior if they can subsidize those excess costs from revenues
provided elsewhere. This is the problem of "cost-shifting."
Even when other payers are not so generous, or obtuse, the
strength of PPS incentives may be at least partially a function
of the hospital's dependence on Medicare patients, which var-
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ies considerably from institution to institution for reasons that
may be very difficult for the institution to control.
More importantly, PPS applies only to Medicare in an
environment in which a growing number of Americans have
no health insurance at all and in which about 25 million Americans are covered by a Medicaid program administered by
states that are experiencing increasing difficulty in maintaining the level of payments to providers. These phenomena have
led the Congress increasingly, and I think appropriately, to
contort PPS in order to compensate for some of these effects.
Thus, especially in the last two or three years, Congress has
increased the Disproportionate Share Adjustment in an effort
to help stem the financial hemorrhaging at hospitals that serve
large numbers of the poor. Under current budgetary rules, this
increase has necessarily come at the expense of all other hospitals. The rationale for the magnitude of this adjustment and
for the analogous maintenance of the size of the Indirect Medical Educational Adjustment is increasingly disconnected from
any empirical notion of the costs of "efficient" hospitals.
Instead, it is tied to evidence on total hospital margins, which
of course are only partly influenced by the effectiveness with
which hospitals respond to PPS incentives.3 2
Of course, PPS's creators in the Reagan Administration
were very much aware that in limiting PPS to Medicare they
were failing to address the needs of hospitals for revenue to
serve those without insurance or with inadequate insurance.
They rejected all-payer rate setting because it embodied the
incarnate evil of regulation. They also explicitly rejected any
notion of federal responsibility to pay for anything other than
the costs necessary to care for Medicare patients. This position, however ideologically consistent, has not proven politically sustainable, thankfully I think. Efforts to overcome this
inherent limitation of a Medicare-only payment system may,
however, weaken the entire rationale for the system.
B.

Inpatient Only

Second and almost as obviously, PPS applies only to inpatient services. As might have been expected, and as indeed
hoped for, the implementation of PPS coincided with significant growth in outpatient services for Medicare patients no less
32. PRoPAC

REPORT,

March 1991, supra note 17, at 36-37.
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than others. It was also hoped that this shift in the sites of
care would save substantial amounts of money. As shown in
Table 2, that has almost certainly not happened.
Here again there are two aspects to the issue. First, the
simple assumption that moving services from inpatient to outpatient produces significant costs savings may simply be wrong.
It is harder to control the volume and quality of services in the
pluralistic, decentralized, diversified, and largely undefined
world of outpatient care than in the well-defined universe of
only 5,000 or so hospitals. More to the point, while an individual procedure or examination may be cheaper to produce in
one setting than another, total costs to the system are reduced
only if the new setting is operating well down the marginal
cost curve and if capacity in the old setting eventually shrinks
to accommodate reduced utilization. Hospitals appear to be
more expensive sites for many kinds of services because they
carry a considerable overhead, a large part of which is standby
capacity for expensive but infrequently utilized capabilities,
and because they produce a range of "joint products." These
costs do not go away when individual services are moved out.
Such costs are just reallocated across a smaller base of remaining inpatient services unless, of course, a lot of hospitals close.
However desirable such closures may be in the abstract, that
appears to be an outcome the political system will not tolerate
in practice.
Further, as hospitals derive a larger proportion of their
revenues from outpatient services that they control themselves, directly or indirectly, their sensitivity to incentives connected to inpatient payment may decline. Here again, the
capacity to generate revenue from non-PPS services weakens
the power of PPS incentives. In this case, however, the growth
of those non-PPS services is a direct result of the narrowness
of PPS, which here is self-defeating.
C. Fairness
Third and perhaps most important politically, PPS may be
increasingly unfair and may be perceived as being unfair. The
tighter that payment rates get relative to costs and the more
that is learned about the system, the more it appears that hospitals suffer or prosper under PPS for reasons at least partially
outside their control. The root problem lies in the system of
uniform national rates tied to measures of case-mix. These
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measures are far superior to any other available tool to measure hospital outputs, but they are still far from adequate as
the basis for the kind of system PPS has created. As reasonably homogenous measures of what hospitals produce, DRGs
are getting better all the time, but they simply are not that
good. At least, DRGs are not good enough to support a system
of flat rates.
Having lived through the implementation of two DRGbased payment systems, it is a source of considerable interest
to me that before implementation considerable attention is
paid to the limitations of the DRG classification system. However, once the system is up and running such interest wanes.
Trade associations, legislators, and lobbyists pay progressively
less attention to issues of DRG creep and improvements in
classification, and increasingly more attention to refinements
in the payment adjustments and the creation of hospital-specific or class-specific exceptions. In one sense, that is a very
healthy phenomenon, since emphasis on the "adequacy of payment" or the "profit or loss" on any particular DRG in any
particular hospital is largely misplaced. The Law of Large
Numbers works more often than not, things tend to cancel
each other out at the hospital level, and payment dollars are
fungible. What counts for hospital managers, and what should
count, is total revenue produced by the payment process, however those revenues are determined. But from the systemwide level, shortcomings of the DRG system produce inequities
that, if they cannot be redressed by improving the DRGs, tend
to get redressed by adding further epicycles to the series of
payment adjustments or do not get addressed at all. Either
approach weakens the intellectual coherence of the system as
well as the power of its "incentives."
I cannot resist noting that one solution to the problem of
inadequacies in the DRG classification system, employed partially in New Jersey, fully in Maryland, but explicitly rejected
by the architects of PPS, is to base rates wholly or in part on
the historical cost experience of individual hospitals. Doing so,
however, smacks of the dreaded anathema of "cost-based reimbursement." A complementary approach is to define outliers
generously, thus substantially increasing the homogeneity of
inlier cases, and to pay outliers on a cost basis. This approach
was also rejected on ideological grounds by the architects of
PPS.
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Markets are not necessarily fair, of course, and the architects of PPS were more concerned with creating market-like
efficiency incentives than with fairness. But I think they also
misunderstood how incentives work in the real world. The
problem with cost-based reimbursement, from a behavioral
perspective, is not that it is cost-based but that it is retrospective; hospitals recover whatever they spend. PPS is cost-based,
too, or would be if the DRGs were more homogenous. The
incentive in the payment system comes from prospectivity,
whatever the price, however derived. The motivation that presumably derives from the prospect of gain or loss is created by
the fact that the price is fixed in advance, however it is fixed. I
believe, and I think the evidence shows, that the likelihood of
the desired behavioral response to that price is increased enormously if the price derives from something close to the experience of the institutions whose behavior one is trying to affect.
It makes much more sense to tell someone to cut his costs by
three percent, for example, then to tell someone to try to beat
a price which may or may not be three percent less, or ten percent less, or more, than his costs would be if he did not change
his behavior at all.
It is also possible, of course, that the architects of PPS just
fell into the common and understandable trap of forgetting
what an average really means. If costs are highly dispersed
around the mean--as they are, even on a case-mix adjusted
basis, with all the other PPS adjustments thrown in-then
paying everyone the average produces exactly the same outlays
as paying everyone their costs. That is simple arithmetic. But
somehow, paying the average feels cheaper. Doing so, however, ignores the fact that while you are really sticking it to
the high-cost producers you are simultaneously and symmetrically paying the low-cost producers a lot more than their costs,
which is also a lot more than you have to.
D.

Goals

More generally, and finally, the shortcomings of PPS
reflect, at root, the profound lack of consensus about what
policymakers are trying to accomplish with the Medicare hospital payment system or with health care policy generally.
There is a considerable school of thought in the public policy
literature that programs such as PPS have great attractiveness
in the American political system because they seem to offer a
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kind of technological fix to a policy dilemma caused by a fundamental lack of consensus about what to do. In that regard
the very complexity, mathematical and statistical sophistication, and often literal incomprehensibility of much of PPS is
part of its appeal. PPS must address a set of diverse and possibly conflicting policy objectives: to minimize Medicare expenditures, except in key Congressional districts; to keep every
"needed" hospital solvent; to maintain or improve access to
care for Medicare beneficiaries; to promote competition among
hospitals; to promote efficiency in a sector with such pervasive
and deep-seated market failure that competition may inherently produce inefficiency; and to encourage technological
change while eliminating waste. Proposing and enacting PPS
may represent not a solution to these problems but a way of
not having to find a solution.
Whether PPS can continue to carry on its back so diverse
and self-contradictory an agenda without spinning itself to
pieces is an empirical question the answer to which we will
eventually find out. One should never underestimate the creativity of the American political system when confronted with
inescapable contradictions, nor the capacity of experts to
tinker incrementally. Certainly, one should not underestimate
the enthusiasm of the shrinking band of cognoscenti with a
professional and economic stake in understanding a $60 billion
dollar system that is increasingly mysterious to everyone else.
It should be apparent, however, and will be increasingly apparent that PPS cannot solve the broader and deeper problems in
the American health care system. It will have increasing difficulty solving its own.

